Abstract: This paper describes the Brazilian experience with inflation targeting in [1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. The data presented in the paper show that inflation targeting managed to reduce inflation in Brazil after its 1999 and 2002 currency crises, with a substantial help of exchange-rate appreciation. The data also show that economic growth was slow under inflation targeting than during exchange-rate targeting in Brazil, but with a smaller volatility and an apparent upward trend during inflation targeting than during exchange-rate targeting. The paper also shows that inflation targeting reduced the real interest rate of the economy, which nevertheless remained well above international standards and more than three times higher than the GDP growth rate of Brazil. The main policy proposition of the paper is that inflation targeting should be combined with an asymmetric dirty floating regime, in which the central bank combat exchange-rate depreciation with restrictive monetary policy, without selling its foreign reserves, but accumulate foreign reserves to slow down appreciation. Such an asymmetric dirty floating should aim at a stable competitive real exchange rate, in order to promote the fast growth of the domestic tradable sector. The other policy proposal is that, because of the endogeneity of potential output at the end of the sample, inflation targeting should be done with moderation in order to avoid a self-fulfilling monetary policy that locks the economy in a slow-growth equilibrium.
Brazil adopted inflation targeting after a brief period of exchange-rate targeting that ended up in a major currency crisis. More specifically, in 1994-98 the Brazilian Government used high domestic interest rates and privatization to attract foreign capital and sustain an appreciated exchange rate peg. The main objective of the Brazilian economic policy at that time was to reduce inflation and the main side effect of exchange-rate appreciation was a substantial increase in the country's current account deficit and net public debt. Similar to what happened in Mexico and Argentina during the 1990s, the Brazilian macroeconomic stabilization strategy was heavily dependent on the continuous inflow of foreign capital and, as a result, the international financial position of Brazil became increasingly fragile after the contagion effects from the East Asian currency crises of 1997 and the Russian currency crisis of 1998. In fact, by the end of 1998 Brazil's currentaccount deficit reached 4.5% of GDP and the low stock of foreign reserves of the Brazilian Central Bank did not allow a defense of the Brazilian currency, the real, in case another speculative attack hit the country.
The inevitable currency crisis came in the beginning of 1999 and resulted in a "maxi-devaluation" of the real. In numbers the Brazilian real/US dollar exchange rate rose 57% in just two months, that is, from 1.21 in December 1998 to 1.90 in February 1999. After that the exchange rate dropped a little and then remained around 1.84 during the rest of 1999, that is, the exchange rate stabilized at a level 52% higher than before the crisis. The initial response of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB for short) to such an abrupt devaluation of the real was a substantial increase in its base interest rate to stop the capital flight from Brazil and to reduce the pass-through of exchange-rate depreciation to inflation. 1 Then, after the exchange rate stabilized at a higher level, in mid-1999, the Government announced that it would start to target inflation. At that time the basic justification for such a move was that the Government needed to substitute a price target for 1 In this paper we define the exchange rate as the domestic price of foreign currency, so that a depreciation of the exchange rate means an increase in the exchange rate, that is, a devaluation of the domestic currency. By analogy, appreciation means a reduction in the exchange rate, that is, a revaluation of the domestic currency. the former exchange-rate target in order to coordinate market expectations and control inflation in a context of floating exchange rates.
In terms of the classic policy "trilemma" of open economies, the option for inflation targeting meant that Brazil chose to have an independent monetary policy, free capital flows, and a floating exchange rate. In practice the situation was obviously different because the exchange rate was an important determinant of the Brazilian inflation rate during the period under analysis. On the one hand, the change in the domestic price of tradable goods in Brazil was (and it continues to be) basically determined by foreign inflation and exchange-rate variations. On the other hand, the prices of some key non-tradable goods in Brazil were also tied to the exchange rate because, during the privatizations of the 1990s, the government allowed the price of some public utilities (basically in the telecommunication and energy sectors) to follow a price index that is heavily influenced by the exchange rate. The inevitable result was that a major part of the Brazilian inflation rate was linked to the exchange rate in 1999-2006. 2 Given the centrality of the exchange rate for Brazilian inflation, it is no surprise that inflation targeting resulted in a disguised and loose exchange-rate targeting by the BCB in 1999-2006. In theory the exchange rate was free to float, but in practice the country ended up with an asymmetric dirty floating regime, that is, a regime in which the BCB had to fight devaluations but to tolerate revaluations in order to meet the inflation targets set by the Brazilian Government. As a result, the interaction between the international financial conditions on the one side and the Brazilian interest rates on the other side explains most of the behavior of the exchange rate in Brazil in [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , which in its turn explain most of the successes and failures of inflation targeting during that period. The objective of this paper is to describe and analyze this experience.
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The Brazilian Inflation-Targeting Regime
The institutional basis of the Brazilian inflation targeting system can be described as follows:
• The National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetário Nacional or CMN for short), formed by the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and the President of the BCB, establishes the inflation targets based on the recommendations of the Finance Minister. All three members are appointed by the President and do not have fixed mandates.
• In June of every year, the CMN establishes the inflation targets, and their corresponding intervals of tolerance, for the next two years. The target consists of the desired variation of a consumer price index (the IPCA index) estimated by the government's statistical branch (the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística or IBGE).
• The BCB is responsible for achieving the target, but no specific instrument or strategy is specified.
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• The Monetary Policy Committee (Comitê de Política Monetária or Copom for short), formed by the President and the Directors of the BCB, decides the level of the Central Bank's base interest rate, the so-known SELIC rate, needed to achieve the inflation target. Occasionally, additional actions such as changes in the banks' reserve requirements can be taken.
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• The target is considered met whenever the observed accumulated inflation during each calendar year falls within the interval of tolerance specified by the CMN.
• If the targets are not met, the President of the BCB has to issue an open letter to the Minister of Finance explaining the causes of the failure, the measures to be adopted to ensure that inflation returns to the target level, and the period of time needed for this to happen.
Since the BCB is not independent and its penalty for not meeting the inflation target is just to explain why that happened, we can conclude that the Brazilian inflation-targeting regime is basically a loose way for the federal government to assure society, especially financial markets, that it will not let inflation run out of control.
Macroeconomic Performance
The macroeconomic performance of Brazil since the adoption of inflation targeting has been mixed. First, considering inflation itself, the Government's targets were met when the international financial conditions allowed it, that is, inflation targeting was successful when the exchange-rate dynamics helped the BCB efforts to control inflation. Second, when compared to the period of exchange-rate targeting, inflation targeting brought a reduction in the base domestic real interest rate, but the Brazilian rate remained well above the international standards because the country needed to appreciate the exchange rate in order to meet its inflation targets. Third, the high real interest rate put an expansionary pressure on the net public debt and this had to be compensated by an increase in the government's primary surplus, that is, the government budget surplus excluding net interest payments. Fourth, the growth performance of the economy under inflation targeting did not improve much when compared to the previous period of exchange-rate targeting, and this happened even though the international environment was much more favorable for economic growth in 1999-2006 than in 1994-98. 6 To facilitate the analysis, we will see each one of these issues separately below.
Starting with inflation itself, Unless stated otherwise, all numbers are annual figures. 8 The inflation rate of 1999 was high when compared to 1998, but modest when compared to the magnitude of the exchange-rate depreciation verified in 1999. As we will see later in this section, most of the small pass-through of the exchange rate to domestic prices in 1999 can be credited to the high real interest rate and the abrupt fiscal crunch practiced by the Brazilian government during that year. 9 As we will also see later in this section, the high real interest rate practiced by the BCB and the very own recessive impact of the two supply shocks on the level of economic activity helped to reduce the magnitude of inflation acceleration. Moving to fiscal policy, the main side effect of the Brazilian high real interest rates was the expansionary impact of net interest payments on public expenditures and debt. Table 2 presents the main fiscal numbers for the period, from which we can identify two distinct phases in the evolution of the net public debt of Brazil.
First, in the first four years of inflation targeting most of the Government net debt was directly or indirectly tied to the exchange rate because the Brazilian Government was a net debtor in foreign currency and most of its domestic debt was formally indexed to the either the exchange rate or the interest rate. 14 So, in the wake of the 1999 currency crisis and the interest-rate hike that followed it, the net interest payments by the Brazilian public sector shot up to 12.5% of GDP, and the ratio of its net public debt to GDP increased in 5.6 pp in just one year. Then, as the exchange rate stabilized at a new and higher level, the net interest payments by the public sector fell to less than 10% of GDP in 2000-2001, but the net domestic debt of the Government continued to rise gradually in relation to GDP because of the huge difference between the real interest rate on the one side, and the growth rate of the economy on the other side. The first phase of debt dynamics ended in 2002, when Brazil experienced another sharp and abrupt exchange-rate depreciation, the net interest payments by the public sector shot up to 13% of GDP, and the net public debt of the country rose to 50.5% of its GDP.
TABLE 2 HERE
14 Indexation to the interest rate increased the impact of exchange-rate depreciation on domestic debt because the BCB usually increased its base rate abruptly after a devaluation of the domestic currency.
The second phase in the dynamics of public debt began in 2003, when the exchange-rate appreciation started to reduce the government net interest payments. The ratio of net public debt to GDP followed the same path in 2004-06, when the Brazilian government was able to repay most of its foreign debt and accumulate a huge amount of foreign reserves. This movement was obviously facilitated by the favorable international trade and financial conditions of the period and, at the end of 2006, the Brazilian government became a net creditor in foreign currency. In contrast, on the domestic front, the high real interest rate continued to increase the Brazilian net public domestic debt, which reached the unprecedented high level of 47.6% of GDP at the end of the period. Altogether, we can say that in this second phase of debt dynamics inflation targeting was characterized by an increase in the ratio of net public domestic debt to GDP and a substitution of domestic debt for foreign debt.
To complete our fiscal outlook, table 2 also shows the evolution of the federal government primary surplus and nominal budget deficit in the inflation- Finally, considering GDP growth, the inflation-targeting period had a slower rate of expansion than the exchange-rate period, but a smaller volatility as well. To illustrate this point, figure 5 shows the moving-average annual GDP growth rate of Brazil in 1994-2006. In numbers, on the one hand the average GDP growth rate was 3.8% during the exchange-rate targeting period, against 2.7% during the inflation targeting period. On the other hand the maximum and minimum growth rates during exchange-rate targeting were 8.5% and zero, respectively, whereas during inflation targeting the maximum and minimum rates were 5.7% and minus 0.8%, respectively. Finally, it should also be noted that the trend growth rate was stationary or declining during the exchange-rate targeting period, but rising during the inflation targeting period. To complete our analysis of inflation targeting in Brazil, let us see these two challenges in more detail.
First, regarding exchange rate, stable inflation requires a stable real exchange rate, but the level of the exchange rate is not determined a priori. There are multiple equilibria and, therefore, the real exchange rate can be stabilized at a competitive or an uncompetitive level. Thus, when the inflation target is ambitiously low and the speed of convergence to it too fast, there will be a tendency to real-exchange-rate appreciation, which in its turn may end up increasing the financial fragility of the economy in the medium run, especially if appreciation is sustained by speculative capital inflows. The usual logical sequence here is that high real interest rate leads to capital inflows and exchangerate appreciation, which in its turns leads to a reduction in the trade and current account balance of the economy, which in their turn makes the economy more vulnerable to shifts in the international liquidity. So, when inflation targeting is too ambitious and financed by speculative capital inflows, the result tends to be a sequence of booms and busts, during which GDP growth fluctuates around a low rate. Another possibility is that inflation targeting stabilizes the real exchange rate at a new low level without compromising the balance of payments of the economy. 20 However, even in this case ambitious inflation targeting can still result in a slow growth rate because an appreciated real exchange rate does not stimulate the development of the domestic tradable sector. In other words, productivity growth is usually faster in the tradable sector and, therefore, an 20 For a formal model of this case, see Barbosa Filho (2006) . appreciated real exchange rate may end up reducing the overall growth rate of the economy.
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The natural solution to the exchange-rate challenge outlined above is to combine inflation targeting with an asymmetric dirty floating that maintains the country's real exchange rate stable and competitive in the long run. The dirty floating will have to be asymmetric because the instruments to combat appreciation are different than the ones use to combat depreciation in order to keep the real exchange rate competitive. In other words, in face of depreciation the government should use its traditional restrictive macroeconomic tools to stop the process and avoid an increase in inflation, without selling much of its foreign reserves.
However, in face of appreciation the government should buy the foreign currency to slow down the process, but with no open compromise with a specific exchange rate. The auxiliary measures to combat appreciation are obviously to increase imports and reduce domestic interest rates so that, at the end of the day, the asymmetric dirty floating ends up creating a sliding floor for the exchange rate.
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Second, regarding growth, inflation targeting is usually aimed at stabilizing economic growth at its potential level, so that it eliminates excess demand pressures that tend to increase inflation, and insufficient demand pressures that tend to do the opposite. The logic form the orthodox standpoint is that the long-run growth rate of the economy is given from outside of macroeconomic issues, by preferences and institutions, and the only thing a responsible central bank can do is to make the economy grow at its potential rate in the long run. So, according to the orthodox view of economic policy, attempts to grow faster than such supplydetermined limit end up increasing inflation, with either no or negative permanent real effects on the economy. The main problem with such a view is that it fails to recognize that the potential output of an economy is an endogenous variable and, therefore, it can and usually is affected by macroeconomic policy itself, including monetary policy.
More specifically, potential output is an unobservable variable that is estimated from the past and expected behavior of the economy.
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Since expectations are usually heavy influenced by the recent past, the estimates of potential output tend to extrapolate current trends to the near future and, in this way, they may create a self-fulfilling monetary policy. An example helps to illustrate the point. Suppose that a conservative central bank estimates a slow potential growth rate for the economy and, based on such a pessimistic estimate, it combats a growth acceleration for fearing that it will increase inflation above the pre-specified target. In doing so the very own actions of the central bank reduce the effective growth rate of the economy, especially of investment, and when potential output is re-estimated again ex-post, the data will confirm that the central bank was right not necessarily because its initial estimates were right, but because the growth deceleration produced by the central bank is automatically translated in a lower estimate of the growth potential of the economy. 24 In short, since the estimates of potential output are highly uncertain at the end of the sample and continuously revised every time a new observation is incorporated into the analysis, the actions the central bank may seem to be correct ex-post because its very own actions produced the scenario that justified it ex-ante.
The endogeneity of potential output at the end of the sample is especially dangerous for an economy, as Brazil, that aims to accelerate its growth rate. The danger here is that because the growth rate in the recent past was low, any strong growth acceleration tends to generate an apparent excessive output gap in the short run. So, if the central bank stops the process too soon, there won't be 23 For an analysis of the methods of estimation of potential output applied to Brazil, see Barbosa-Filho (2005) . 24 So far most of the mainstream studies on the uncertainty associated with estimates of potential output have been focused on the reliability of forecasts based on real-time data, rather than on the implications of a self-fulfilling monetary policy. For an example of the mainstream approach, see Orphanides and van Norden (2005) enough time for the estimates of potential output to pick the structural change in the growth prospects of the economy. The final result is either that the economy never takes off, or that it takes off very slowlly. On the other hand, the endogeneity of potential output does not obviously mean that authorities live in sort of "field of dreams", in which: if you believe, growth will come. 25 There are objective limits to the growth rate of the economy that cannot be avoided by optimistic expectations like, for instance, the maximum supply of energy, the stock of foreign reserves and a zero unemployment rate.
The endogeneity of potential output only means that there may be more than one equilibrium position for the GDP growth rate and, therefore, the speed of convergence to the inflation target is also a relevant variable for economic growth.
As it usually happens in economics, central banks face a trade-off in this area: on the one hand quick disinflation may lock the economy in a slow-growth equilibrium, but on the other hand slow disinflation may lock the economy in a high-inflation equilibrium. Even though this trade-off has yet to be emphasized by modern macroeconomic theory, it is an unavoidable matter for policy makers who deal with the real world.
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Conclusion
Inflation targeting represents an improvement in relation to the previous monetary policy regime adopted by Brazil, but it can and should be improved in order to increase the growth rate of the economy. In general terms the main conclusions from the previous sections can be summarized in ten points. Seventh, the asymmetric dirty floating should aim at a stable competitive real exchange rate, in order to promote the fast growth of the domestic tradable sector, and in this way push the country's exports and imports up without increasing the foreign financial fragility of the economy. Eight, aggregate estimates of potential output are not good guides for the demand pressures on inflation in moments of structural growth acceleration or deceleration. Ninth, because of the endogeneity of potential output at the end of the sample, inflation targeting should be done with moderation in order to avoid a self-fulfilling monetary policy that locks the economy in a slow-growth equilibrium. Tenth, a fast convergence to a low inflation target may produce a permanently low growth rate, but a slow convergence to a moderate inflation target can produce a permanently high inflation. Source: Brazilian Central Bank (www.bcb.gov.br) and author's calculation. The inflation targets are the targets set at least one year in advance. The exception is 1999, when the target was set in June of that year. The revised target is the target set in the corresponding year. The exchangerate variation refers to the Brazilian real/US dollar exchange rate, and the base interest rate is the SELIC interest rate, set by the Central Bank of Brazil, and cumulated over the year. The real interest rate was obtained by deflating the nominal interest rate by the inflation rate cumulated over the year, according to the IPCA index. Source: Brazilian Central Bank (www.bcb.gov.br) and author's calculation. The primary deficit is the government budget deficit excluding net interest payments. The nominal deficit is the total budget deficit, that is, the primary deficit plus net interest payments by the public sector. The numbers for the whole Brazilian public sector refer to the federal, state and municipal governments, and the state-owned enterprises. 4.0 j a n / 9 8 j u l / 9 8 j a n / 9 9 j u l / 9 9 j a n / 0 0 j u l / 0 0 j a n / 0 1 j u l / 0 1 j a n / 0 2 j u l / 0 2 j a n / 0 3 j u l / 0 3 j a n / 0 4 j u l / 0 4 j a n / 0 5 j u l / 0 5 j a n / 0 6 j u l / 0 6 j a n / 0 7 j u l / 0 7
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